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Complexity provides a benchmark for evaluating 
the direction of evolution...
To contribute to greater harmony, 
a person’s consciousness has to become complex.
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi
As soon as infants acquire the names for objectsthey begin placing them into categories fromwhich they make accurate predictions about
them (Gelman & Markman, 1986). Members of such
categories seem to acquire an underlying “essence.” It
is not hard to imagine how this tendency to objectify
the external world into objects, and later into struc-
tures assembled out of these objects, was of evolution-
ary usefulness to our ancestors. Nevertheless, this way
of comprehending reality does not always serve us well
when we seek to understand our inner lives.
Indeed, it can hardly be doubted that many of the
most important variables studied by psychologists are
processes, a fact that was explicitly recognized in the
richly contextual theories of such psychological pio-
neers as William James and John Dewey. Nevertheless,
the early years of the 20th century found American
and British psychology moving in the direction of
reductionistic and structural descriptions of psycho-
logical phenomena at roughly the same time that fun-
damental theory in physics was shifting to the radical-
ly holistic and process-oriented worldview of quantum
mechanics. In those days, there was an almost fanati-
cal flavor to the arguments made in favor of limiting
what “legitimate psychology” would accept to a small-
scale empirical scientific enterprise carried out in the
learning and psychophysical laboratories (a la Watson
and Titchener), and discouraging the broad applica-
tion of its findings to the clinic or other spheres of
applied psychology. This effort to constrain the field
was cast in stone by the production of written histo-
ries. The most prominent of these was penned by
Titchener’s own student E.G. Boring (1929/1950),
that by exclusion characterized psychology as a reduc-
tionistic science carried out in academic and medical
laboratories by such heroic researchers as Helmholtz
and Wundt, Titchener’s mentor. It is ironic that the
methods of physics were often held up as the ideal to
which the new science of psychology might aspire.
It is certainly the case that psychological processes
can sometimes be freeze-framed in the laboratory to
yield useful information, but it is also the case that
they must be honored as processes if they are to be
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In the spirit of William James, we present a process view of human consciousness. Our approach,
however, follows upon Charles Tart’s original systems theory analysis of states of consciousness,
although it differs in its reliance on the modern sciences of complexity, especially dynamical sys-
tems theory and its emphasis on process and evolution. We argue that consciousness experience
is constructive in the sense that it is the result of ongoing self-organizing and self-creating
(autopoietic) processes in the mind and body. These processes follow a broad developmental
agenda already described by psychologists such as Jean Piaget. Similar constructive transforma-
tions of consciousness appear to have occurred across the course of human history. In this sense,
phylogeny indeed recapitulates ontogeny. Finally, modern developmental research suggests that
the most advanced levels of human growth transform consciousness in the direction of increas-
ing selflessness and spirituality, rather than simply toward greater intelligence.
understood in depth. For example, Piaget’s levels of
cognitive development seem to present a structural
view of the growth of the intellect (Flavell, 1963;
Gruber & Voneche, 1977). But Piaget actually consid-
ered them to be outward manifestations of underlying
cognitive processes which he represented as mathemat-
ical transformations (i.e., as processes). Kohlberg’s
(1981) theory of moral development likewise exhibits
structural levels and stages, and was inspired to a sig-
nificant degree by Piaget’s own earlier work, but
Kohlberg himself stressed that beneath the surface
reside complex cognitive processes of exactly the type
originally identified by Piaget. Freud’s early writings,
which emphasized the processes by which neurotic
symptoms and dream narratives emerge in the context
of a unified fabric of the individual’s life, present
another example. As time went by, Freud slipped
increasingly into structural language, referring to the
id, ego, and superego as fixed features of the psyche
(Archard, 1984).
As is well known, William James (1890/1981)
viewed the mind as a stream of consciousness rather than
as a series of stationary experiences. In agreement with
this, it is generally understood that phenomenal reality
presents itself as a changing display of experience (e.g.,
Guenther, 1989; Kockelmans, 1967). Beyond this, we
note that many descriptions of the richest and most
intense forms of consciousness, of transpersonal expe-
riences for example, characterize reality as a radiant
flowing process of coming-into-being (Gebser,
1949/1986; Guenther, 1989; Rama, 1981). In line
with such observations, the approach we have taken in
this article and elsewhere (Combs, 2002; Combs &
Krippner, 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b) views process as
primary and structure as secondary.
The roots of the process perspective reach at least
as far back as Heraclitus in the West and Lao-Tsu in
the East, while several important developments in
recent decades have set the stage for the present work.
These include the appearance of a sophisticated
process philosophy in the writings of Alfred North
Whitehead and other recent American philosophers
(Rescher, 1996). They also include the creation of sys-
tems theory by Bertalanffy (1968), which has been
developed by Arthur Koestler (1979), Erich Jantsch
(1980), Ervin Laszlo (1972, 1987), and many others.
Nobel laureate chemist and mathematician Ilya
Prigogine (e.g., Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) made a
major contribution to this theoretical lineage by
demonstrating how complex systems can, through
their own intrinsic dynamics, evolve toward increasing
organization and complexity. Meanwhile, several
mathematicians developed methods for representing
complex dynamical systems, that is, systems that change
through time, by modeling their evolutionary trajecto-
ries (e.g., Abraham, 1991). Chaos theory, which was to
become widely celebrated in many circles, grew out of
dynamical systems theory. In this article we make use
of the language of dynamical systems theory to take a
step toward the development of a process model of
consciousness.
Evolution
Strictly speaking, a system is considered dynamical ifit moves or changes (i.e., evolves) according to a
mathematical rule of transformation. An example is
the swinging of a pendulum. If the pendulum’s chang-
ing position and velocity are plotted in a state space of
all combinations of position and velocity, the resulting
figure is called a phase portrait. If the pendulum were
frictionless the phase portrait would describe a single
closed circle or ellipse as it cycled through the same
round of states indefinitely. The fact that the circle is
closed tells us that we are dealing with a cyclic or fixed
cycle attractor, (i.e., one that repeats itself exactly in
time). Here, the term attractor indicates the tendency
of the pendulum to return to this previous pattern of
activity even if displaced from it, say, by momentarily
causing it to swing more swiftly or more slowly. Such
stability is what gives the pendulum its reliability,
making it useful in clocks.
Allowing a clock that contains such a pendulum
to run down, so that it swings in decreasing arcs until
it comes to rest, generates a phase portrait that spirals
to a point near the center. The state of inactivity rep-
resented by this point is termed a static attractor. Such
attractors are of relatively little interest to the study of
living systems. Far more important is a third class of
attractors that cannot be properly categorized as either
point or cyclic, and for this reason was termed
“strange” by those who first discovered it. Nowadays
they are usually referred to as chaotic attractors. They
exhibit activity patterns that are evident to the eye, are
roughly cyclic in appearance, but never exactly repeat
themselves. 
The behavior of many complex systems can be
represented as chaotic attractors. An example is the
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weather, in which humidity, temperature, wind veloc-
ity, and so on, change from moment to moment, day
to day, month to month, and year to year, in patterns
that are evident upon inspection but which never
exactly repeat themselves. Below we explore the idea
that our inner lives are composed of our own kind of
inner weather, made up of moods, thoughts, feelings,
memories, perceptions, and the like.
A phase portrait of a chaotic attractor looks some-
thing like the line made by a cork ball dipped in an
inkwell and set rolling inside a circular trough carved
into a thick wooden tabletop. The floor of the trough
represents the lowest potential energy state of the sys-
tem, while the walls might slope in either gradually or
abruptly. In dynamical systems terms this trough is
termed the basin of the attractor. If the ball continues
to roll around inside it in an endless erratic path, we
say it is caught in a chaotic attractor. In this example
the sides of the trough represent the entire range of the
attractor in the state space of the table top. If the ball
escapes from the trough and rolls away, we say that the
system has escaped this attractor basin and has gone
off, as it were, in search of another. In plain English,
the system has escaped one pattern of activity and
must now find another. 
These ideas are especially rich when applied to a
class of physical systems identified by Prigogine (e.g.,
Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) as dissipative structures.
Such systems have a unique ability to take in energy
from the environment and use it to reorganize them-
selves into increasing complexity. Some of the energy,
however, is eventually dissipated back into the envi-
ronment in less organized forms, such as heat; thus the
term dissipative. The biosphere of the Earth is an
example of such a system. It absorbs sunlight, creating
life forms and ecologies that evolve toward high orders
of complexity, while heat, which is less organized than
sunlight, is radiated back into space. Living organisms
themselves are dissipative systems, ingesting highly
organized energy in the form of food, or sunlight in
the case of plants, and dissipating less organized
byproducts back into the environment.
In line with the above, biological systems have the
ability to organize and structure their own internal
processes; thus we say they are self-organizing systems.
In 1974, biologists Francisco Varela and Humberto
Maturana went beyond this notion to introduce the
idea that living organisms are autopoietic, or self-creating
(e.g., Varela, Maturana, & Uribe, 1974). From this
point of view an organism is a system whose first order
of business is the production of a network of processes
that, taken together, comprise that very organism. For
instance, the most important product of the overall
metabolic activity of a living cell is the cell itself. Thus,
the cell can be thought of as a network of genetically-
initiated processes that sustain themselves through
time, even though the material substances that consti-
tute them change continuously. All living organisms
are autopoietic systems, as are ecologies, and the entire
intricate web of life on Earth (Lovelock, 1988;
Lovelock & Margulis, 1974).
Once we understand the idea of an autopoietic
system we see that it has potential for many applica-
tions. The basic notion of a set of processes that recre-
ate themselves by their own mutual interactions can be
applied, for example, to chemical, neuronal, computa-
tional, and even cognitive systems. It has been shown,
for example, that certain combinations of complex
molecules will interact with each other in such a way
as to create more of their own kind (Kauffman, 1995).
Systems theorist George Kampis (1991) approaches
the entire idea of self-creating systems in terms of what
he calls component systems. Such a system is composed
of a set of elements that interact to create new ele-
ments, including the original set. The actual elements
in question can be chemical molecules, interacting
computational codes in a computer program, or cog-
nitive processes. The basic idea of a component system
is that its elements represent processes that encounter
each other in a kind of interactive soup. Notice that
these components can be understood as either physical
interactions between, say, molecules, or as logical oper-
ations that are specified, for example, by operational
codes in a computer program. Mathematician Ben
Goertzel (1994), for instance, has proposed just such
autopoietic computational systems. The present
authors have developed a similar line of thought cen-
tering on human cognitive and other psychological
processes (Combs, 2002; Combs & Krippner, 1998,
1999a, 1999b), an idea to which we will return shortly.
Kampis emphasizes the creative potential of com-
ponent systems, observing that they produce new and
creative outcomes that cannot be predicted by compu-
tational procedures. Goertzel differs on this point,
arguing that all such processes can be represented com-
putationally, at least under ideal conditions. Both,
however, agree that creativity flows from the interac-
tions of the components, which tend also to produce
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novel new components. And these new components in
turn interact with each other, and with previously
existing components, to produce even newer compo-
nents not foreseeable from the original constituents.
Here it is helpful to keep in mind that these “compo-
nents” are actually transformational processes, such as
the transformational operations specified in computer
codes, chemical changes facilitated by catalytic interac-
tions, or cognitive transformations leading, for exam-
ple, to new ideas or concepts. Ultimately, such creative
processes can combine to alter the basic form of the
system itself. From a larger view, such systems can be
understood as rolling autopoietic events in which old
patterns evolve into new ones.
One goal of this paper is to show that our imme-
diate experience, the Jamesian stream of consciousness, is
composed of psychological processes such as thoughts,
memories, and emotions, which form an ongoing
autopoietic system that recreates itself from moment
to moment through the interaction of its psychologi-
cal components. Indeed, we are concerned here not
only with the conscious experience itself, but also with
its chemical and physiological constituents within the
brain and body. With this in mind, we have utilized
the term mindbody (Combs & Krippner, 1998) to
refer to the entire set of mental and physiological
aspects of a person’s moment-to-moment experience.
Our contention is that the experiential life of the
mindbody recreates itself from moment to moment by
virtue of the interaction of its constituent component
processes. As with other complex component systems,
such as the metabolic cycles that interact to create the
total complex event of a living cell, or the patterns of
the weather, composed of elements such as heat,
atmospheric pressure, and wind velocity, the life of the
mindbody is both stable and creative. It is stable
because the entire regime of interacting component
processes of which it is formed lend it stability, as we
also see in the life of a cell. It is creative because the
interactions of the component psychological processes
create new processes which, interacting with older
ones, lead to novelty and even to long-term growth, or
evolution, in the system as a whole. Let us consider
these points in order.
Stability, Self-Creation, and 
Change in the Mindbody System
Consider the tendency of moods to sustain them-selves for brief or even long periods of time
through a continuous cycle of interactions of thought,
memories, imaginings, and feelings, as well as physio-
logical factors such as hormone or neurotransmitter
levels in the blood. There is evidence that a particular
mood such as anger, sadness, or joy, promotes the
recall of state-specific memories that remind us of
events experienced during previous instances of those
very moods (Bower, 1981; Eich, 1980). When we are
sad we remember unhappy episodes from the past.
Such recollections strengthen the state of mindbody
that produces them. Our cognitive and emotional systems
slip into an attractor basin that can be characterized as
a mood of sadness. Such a state involves alterations in
the neurochemistry of the brain as well as hormonal
changes in the blood that further strengthen the pull
of this mood attractor. In this connection, two labora-
tories have found that ordinary mood fluctuations fol-
low chaotic patterns from hour to hour and day to day
(Combs, Winkler, & Daley, 1994; Hanna, 1991), as
would be expected for a complex autopoietic system.
An important notion for understanding long-term
changes and transformations of human consciousness
is the idea that cognitive systems can be autopoietic as
well. This is logically similar to the idea, noted above,
that computer codes can be written to produce a kind
of operational soup that, once set in motion, recreates
itself over time and gives birth to new and novel codes.
Something similar to this can be seen in terms of the
human mind. Consider Piaget’s developmental cogni-
tive model of the child’s understanding of the world
(e.g., Flavell, 1963; Piaget, 1952, 1954). Here, each
Piagetian level of development represents an experien-
tial world, a noetic regime according to which reality
is interpreted as sets of magical relationships (preoper-
ational period thinking), relatively simple cause-and-
effect relationships (concrete operational thinking), or
sophisticated causal interactions (formal operational
thinking). At each of these developmental levels the
cognitive operations, or schemata in Piaget’s original
terms, are composed of elements that mutually create
and support each other. For instance, the experience of
the world that is made possible by the formal opera-
tions intellect relies on logical schemata such as
reversibility, asymmetric relationships, conservation of
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volume and number, and the ability to perform multiple
classification and conceptualize hierarchical relation-
ships. These concepts, or schemata, form mutually
supporting networks. 
For example, the schemata for the conservation of
volume allows one to know that when water is poured
from a tall narrow glass into a short wide one the vol-
ume remains the same. Children under about five
years of age do not believe this, and will argue that
there is less water in the second glass because they see
that the water level is lower. As time goes by, however,
children acquire a schema that allows them to com-
pensate for the depth of the water in the glass by tak-
ing into account its width. Thus, the new schema of
“width compensating for height” contributes to and
indeed becomes part of the more sophisticated schema
of the conservation of volume. Still another schema
that contributes to conservation is termed reversibility.
This is the ability to mentally run operations back-
ward, for example, to imagine that if the water in the
low wide glass were poured back into the original tall
narrow glass it would come up to exactly the same level
that it did originally. This schema, combined with the
others above, completes a tight package of operations
that both create and stabilize the idea of conservation
of volume. Indeed, we can imagine that if any one of
these schema failed, the others would rush in to recre-
ate and stabilize it. At the same time, when the
schemata of conservation becomes well established, it
in turn provides both a context and a confirmation of
the component schemata of which it is composed.
It is worth noting that while psychological models
of development such as those of Piaget (Flavell, 1963;
Piaget, 1952, 1954), Cook-Greuter (1999), Fischer
and Bidell (1998), Gilligan (1993), Gowan (1974),
Kegan (1982, 1994), Kohlberg (1981), Torbert
(1972), and Wade (1996) are often presented in terms
of structures, they are more correctly understood as
cognitive processes. For instance, Piaget’s work dealt
with how children and adults interpret reality. The
word “interpret” is a verb that references a process,
rather than a noun that references a structure.
Speaking of a Piagetian schema as a “structure” is no
more than a figure of speech. The same can be said for
Kegan’s developmental model, which extends beyond
Piaget’s formal operations thinking and into what he
calls “postconventional” levels of development.
Likewise, Kohlberg’s and Gilligan’s work on moral
thinking examines how people make moral decisions
(yet another process).
It is our idea that psychological development can
best be understood as the unfolding of a series of noetic
regimes, each undergirded by its own network of psy-
chological process. Together they create an entire
process fabric for experiencing the world, a stream of
thought as James suggested, forming the core of that
individual’s experience of reality. In this discussion we
focus especially on the cognitive aspects of each devel-
opmental level simply because research in the field of
development tells us more about cognitive develop-
ment than, say, emotional, mnemonic, social, or per-
ceptual development. However in the larger picture
these must also be included in each developmental
regime (Fischer & Bidell, 1998). Now let us consider
the transformation of such regimes during psycholog-
ical growth.
Evolution and Growth: Ontogeny
Recapitulates Phylogeny (Again)
In dynamical systems terms, a system is said to evolveif it follows a rule of transformation (Abraham,
1991). From this point of view evolution and growth
are closely related. We believe that this similarity is
more than formal; that when it comes to the human
mindbody there are deep similarities between individ-
ual development from childhood through advanced
stages of adult development and the psychological evo-
lution of the human mindbody across history. First, let
us consider development, then move on to the ques-
tion of evolution.
Again taking the Piagetian model as a guide, let us
note that each increment in development sees separate
schemata combining to form hierarchical structures of
greater complexity at the next level up. For example,
during the sensorimotor period of infancy the initially
separate schemata of grasping and visual tracking com-
bine to form an eye-hand coordination schema that
will continue to increase in complexity and flexibility
for years to come. In similar fashion, developmental
psychologist Rhonda Kellogg (1969) documented the
spontaneous productions of art in children from
throughout the world, finding that the freely drawn
patterns at one level of development combine to form
the elements of the next and more complex stage of
drawing. Early circles, squares, and triangles come
together to form houses, cars, and people. Research
suggests that an analogous cognitive process underlies
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the development of moral thinking, leading finally to
the abstract moral judgment of the advanced adult
(Kohlberg, 1981). Similar changes are seen in the
development of the self (Kegan, 1982, 1994).
In all such theoretical models, each stage of devel-
opment is built out of processes already present in ear-
lier stages, which are combined in new, more complex
and effective ways at the next level. For instance, Kelly
(1999) has shown how formal operational stage
schemata recombine in post–formal operational think-
ing to yield the more advanced recursive, dialogic
(embracing opposites such as yin and yang), and holo-
graphic modes of thought described by French philoso-
pher Edgar Morin (1999). When a sufficient number
of such developmental events have taken place to cre-
ate an entirely new cognitive fabric, a new way of
understanding and experiencing reality, we say that the
individual has advanced to the next level of develop-
ment. In the above example, Kelly suggests that the
appearance of recursive, dialogic, and holographic
thought yields a new level of cognitive development
equivalent to Gebser’s (1949/1986) “integral” struc-
ture of consciousness. Our point here, however, is that
more is involved in such growth processes than the
accumulation of small footholds until large plateaus
have been reached. If the sciences of complexity tell us
anything, it is that small changes eventually lead to
new emergent regimes of organization. Such regimes
tend to exhibit their own properties that are not, even
in theory, predictable from an analysis of the elements
of which they are composed. Examples range from the
“wetness” of water, not predictable on the basis of a
knowledge of the physics of hydrogen and oxygen
molecules, to the collective behavior of groups of liv-
ing organisms, such as ant colonies, not predictable
from the study of the individual ants that make them up.
Indeed, one of Prigogine’s (e.g., Prigogine &
Stengers, 1984) most important discoveries was that
self-organizing systems can reach levels of complexity
at which they spontaneously reorganize, or bifurcate,
into new and complex structures that exhibit entirely
novel features. Cardiac cells placed separately in a sup-
portive medium rhythmically contract at different fre-
quencies, but when a critical density is reached they
begin to pulsate in unison, forming something like a
single organ. Our own brains and bodies are living tes-
timony to the dynamic of emergence, in which the
whole may be either more or less complex than its con-
stituent elements. But in every instance it is greater
than the sum of its parts, and in many instances is sur-
prisingly independent of them. Hence, not only is
such a system more than the sum of its parts, it is dif-
ferent from the sum of its parts.
Considering the limits of organizational complexity
at one level, and how such limits give way to richer
organization at the next, Morin (1999) observes:
If the situation is logically hopeless, this indicates
that we have arrived at a logical threshold at which
the need for change and the thrust toward complex-
ification can allow for the transformations that
could bring metasystems into being. It is when
…novelty and creativity …can arise. Thus, it was
when the chemical organization of groups of mil-
lions of molecules become impossible that a living
auto-eco-organization first appeared. (p. 107)
Here, our point is that each level of psychological
development is equivalent to a new psychological
regime. (Again, we emphasize the cognitive aspects of
such regimes only because psychologists know more
about this aspect of development.) Thus, each level
carries with it a new experience of the world and of
reality itself. This may seem a strong statement, but
consider the world experienced by the child in contrast
with that of the adult. It can hardly be doubted that
these represent two substantially different orders of
reality. We might go so far as to entertain the idea that
the child experiences an ordinary state of conscious-
ness that differs from that of the adult. Here it can be
seen that, when we conceptualize each developmental
level as an autopoietic regime of cognitive and other
psychological processes, we have in hand ideas useful
for understanding states of consciousness as well. We
will return to this idea below.
First let us proceed to the matter of evolution, asking
specifically whether psychological ontogeny recapitu-
lates phylogeny: does the course of individual psycho-
logical development follow a pattern similar to that
seen in the history of the human mind? A detailed
examination of this question is outside the scope of
these pages, but the answer from many scholars who
have probed this question in depth is a resounding
“yes” (e.g., Barnes, 2000; Combs, 2002; Feuerstein,
1987; Wilber, 1981, 2000). Consider, for example,
that the major historical structures of consciousness
identified by the European cultural historian Jean
Gebser (1949/1986) map surprisingly well onto the
stages described by developmental theorists such as
Piaget (Flavell, 1963), Graves (1961, 1970; also see
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Beck & Cowan, 1996), Loevinger (Loevinger &
Wessler, 1970), and Kegan (1982). Both Combs
(2002) and Wilber (1998a) have given particular
attention to the work of these theorists as well as that
of others. Barnes’s (2000) book, Stages of Thought,
examines this whole issue from the point of view of the
history of religion. Working almost entirely within
biblical and Judo-Christian theological scholarship
traditions, he makes a systematic and detailed case that
the history of religion, especially the Judaic and
Christian traditions, tracks the Piagetian levels of
thinking with startling accuracy, from biblical begin-
nings right up to modern times. Since Barnes seems
virtually unaware of most of the above research—a fact
verified by personal correspondence—his work is of
special interest because it offers more or less independ
ent support for these ideas.
Table 1 incorporates the insights of many develop-
mental theorists to yield an overview of developmental
stages. It is based on an unpublished collaboration
between Susanne Cook-Greuter and Ken Wilber
(Cook-Greuter & Wilber, 2000). The stages are
labeled with terms drawn from Piaget and Wilber. It
includes several levels of postconventional develop-
ment of interest to transpersonal psychology. We will
return to these below, but first let us note briefly that
were we to move from this large overview to a detailed
perspective we would observe that each person devel-
ops in a unique pattern across different content areas.
For example, one person might be gifted in mathemat-
ics, or music, or moral thinking, but relatively slow to
develop in other areas. Such a distribution or décalage, to
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Table 1. A 10 point developmental scale.1

















































[1Terms are based on a number of developmental systems. e.g., see Wilber (1998a).]
use Piaget’s (1952; Flavell, 1963) term, of development
into separate “lines” (Wilber, 1998a) is recognized in
virtually all developmental theories. The present
authors recognize it as well, but to carry its detailed
consideration every step along our way would burden
the present paper beyond bearing.
Psychological Growth Is Increasing
Complexity
Now, let us return to the theme of psychologicalgrowth as the dynamical evolution of psycholog-
ical process through increasingly complex regimes. We
can imagine such growth as a series of attractors, each
constituting a higher order of complexity than the one
before. We suggest that these attractors correspond to
the levels of development shown, for example, in Table
1. Each developmental level is a new and more com-
plex psychological regime, more flexible and more
competent than the one before, but incorporating pre-
vious regimes into its own process structure. Above, we
tried to give a clear indication of how such transforma-
tive growth processes occur in developmental theories
such as those of Piaget, Kohlberg, and Kegan. Now, we
extend this idea in the direction of postconventional
levels of development. (Here we use “postconventional”
informally to refer to all levels above the average
adult.) According to our view, it is these advanced lev-
els that carry us into the transpersonal realms.
What evidence is there to support this view?
Unfortunately, when we come to the transpersonal lev-
els of development we leave most mainstream psycho-
logical  research behind, sometimes finding ourselves
relying on the personal reports of so-called sages and
mystics. Though there have been many scientific
investigations of the effects of spiritual practices such
as meditation, Tai Chi, yoga, and the like, these usually
address specific interests of particular groups of
researchers, with questions such as: “Does meditation
contribute to stress reduction?” Findings are rarely
framed in a developmental context. There are, however,
a few exceptions. A notable study of postconventional
development, for example, was conducted by Susanne
Cook-Greuter (1999) as a dissertation under the
supervision of Robert Kegan. She based her work on
Loevinger’s (Loevinger & Wessler, 1970) model of ego
development, carefully analyzing over one thousand
interviews with postconventional individuals of both
genders. Cook-Greuter found a spiraling pattern of
postconventional growth in which individuals first
move toward individuation and autonomy, and then
begin to experience a growing sense of unity with oth-
ers and the universe. 
The broad view of postconventional development
seen in Cook-Greuter’s findings is consistent with that
shown in Table 1. Moving through postconventional
Stage 6, her participants disclosed an upward trend
first toward increasing individuation and autonomy;
then, with a growing awareness of their own self-constructs
of reality, they shifted toward an increasing sense of
unity with others and with the world in general. These
findings are in agreement with the pattern of develop-
ment seen in Table 1, and are also in accord with Clair
Graves’ (1961, 1970; also see Beck & Cowan, 1996)
finding that growth at all levels tends to oscillate
between self-actualization and identity with the greater
community.
Paradoxically, the highest levels of growth seem to
carry an inherent simplicity reflected in a more direct
experience of reality. Surprisingly, such clarity is in fact
obtained through complexity. The basic idea, devel-
oped in detail by psychoanalyst Stanley Palombo
(1999), is that through the development of complex
networks of interactions in the brain, one’s sense of self
becomes integrated into a single fabric of thoughts,
feelings, and motivations. Otherwise they drift as dis-
connected attractors, manipulating us like puppets
without our control or understanding. In other words,
wholeness brings clarity. In contrast to this highly
desirable state of affairs, the human condition often
involves considerable fragmentation. Motivational
aspects of the mind are only loosely connected to cog-
nitive belief systems, rational process, perceptions, and
emotions. Palombo argues that it is the goal of psy-
chotherapy to connect these disparate elements into
more complex, fully interconnected systems in which
few psychological processes continue on their own
outside of awareness.
Seen from the experiential side, the simplicity and
purity of an integrated mindbody is possible because
the individual can stand back from the typical welter
of mental and emotional activity to find a place of
greater quiet and beauty. Thus, it is through objectivity
that we gain the ecstatic realms of pure experience
(Combs, 2002). This may seem a strange notion, but
we find it expressed in virtually every wisdom tradi-
tion. Sri Aurobindo’s writings, for instance, remind us
again and again that the yogic transformation begins
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only when we acquire the ability to look down on the
buzzing mechanistic mind from a position of objective
clarity (Aurobindo, 1971):
Those who get beyond the average, have in one way
or other, or at least at certain times and for certain
purposes, to separate the two parts of the mind, the
active part, which is a factory of thoughts and the
quiet masterful part which is at once a Witness and
a Will, observing them, judging, rejecting, eliminat-
ing, accepting, ordering corrections and changes,
the Master in the House of Mind. (p. 126)
All types of insight meditation advise us to learn
the skill of quietly observing our thoughts and feel-
ings. In the Taoist masterpiece on meditation, The
Secret of the Golden Flower, we are instructed to follow
our thoughts back to their origins, and thereby dis-
solve them into clear light (Cleary, 2000). Many other
examples could be given, but the point is that to gain
the highest forms of experience we must first become
masters of objectivity—and to do that we must be uni-
fied within our own mindbodies.
States and Realms of Consciousness: 
The human growth potential
So far we have said that the dynamical regimes of thepsyche, especially patterns of cognition, play a
major role in defining the conscious reality that we
experience. Now we consider how states of conscious-
ness might be understood in terms of this framework.
In a series of papers we have explored the idea that
states of consciousness—ordinary wakefulness, sleeping
and dreaming states, meditative and drug-elicited
states, and such—occur when elements of our experi-
ence such as thoughts, memories, emotions, and per-
ceptions combine to form the unique dynamic pat-
terns of activity that characterize each such state
(Combs, 2002; Combs & Krippner, 1997, 1998,
1999a, 1999b). We suggest that these patterns are best
thought of as attractors in the mindbody, that is,
regimes of cognitive and neural activity that together
form organized dynamical structures. Such patterns
seem to be self-organizing and self-sustaining, as noted
above in the case of moods such as sadness or joy. In
other words, a state of consciousness can be viewed as
a self-organizing, or autopoietic process in the mind-
body. This view is consistent with Charles Tart’s
(1972, 1975) early conceptualization of a state of con-
sciousness as a combined system of psychological and
physiological functions that join together to form a
coherent pattern, or gestalt.
In this view, the complex patterns of activity that
constitute a state of consciousness are made of many of
the same psychological constituents—patterns of cog-
nition, perceptions, emotions, and so on—that deter-
mine one’s level of psychological development. This in
mind, a reasonable hypothesis is that states of con-
sciousness can be thought of as inflections on the
developmental patterns of consciousness described
above (Combs, 2002; Combs & Krippner, 1998). In
this sense we might think of a state of consciousness as
a platform resting upon a larger supporting develop-
mental level. A more technically precise way of saying
this is that a state of consciousness is viewed as a self-
organizing, or autopoietic system, nested within a larger
developmental autopoietic system. If this hypothesis is
true we might expect that even seemingly resilient
states of consciousness, such as those experienced in
drug intoxication and dreaming, might differ for indi-
viduals who are at different developmental levels. As
counterintuitive as this idea may seem at first, there is
considerable evidence that dream experiences are relat-
ed to developmental level, at least in terms of the ages
of children (Foulkes, 1999), and informal observation
seems consistent with the idea that drug-induced expe-
riences differ with the individual’s developmental level
as well. We suggest that such a possibility warrants fur-
ther research.
Nevertheless, certain states of conscious seem to
have a kind of subjective resilience, or perhaps we
should say that they carry a strong sense of reality,
which other states, such as daydreaming or hypna-
gogia, seem to lack. What is more, descriptions of certain
meditative, imaginal, near-death, and even post-
mortem states from many spiritual traditions, appear
to have an evident universal coinage, such that these
states, or something very much like them, have been
described by observers in many times and cultures
(Arcari, Combs, & Krippner, in preparation; Brown,
1986; Combs, 2002; Grof & Halifax, 1977; Wilber,
1998b). In many wisdom traditions these are said to
be more than states of consciousness, but independent
realities or realms of being (e.g., Chittick, 1994;
Corbin, 1966, 1976/1990; Graham, 1990; Groff &
Halifax, 1978; Masters, 2002; Norbu, 1989;
Thurman, 1994). Each wisdom tradition has its own
version of this theme, but many articulate roughly four
primary realms, while some include a variety of subdivisions
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within these. Examples of the latter include the bardo
states of the Buddhists (Thurman, 1994), all in the
“subtle” realms, and the imaginal realms of the Sufis
(Chittick, 1994; Corbin, 1976/1990), also in the
“subtle” realms. Indian Vedanta philosophy, said to be
the outgrowth of the reports of yogic practioners over
millennia, has one of the simplest and most inclusive
versions of this grand vision. It posits the existence of
gross, subtle, and causal realms, which are often associ-
ated with the conscious states of wakefulness, dream
sleep, and, paradoxically, dreamless sleep (e.g.,
Tigunait, 1983). Vedanta also describes a forth state,
turiya, the transcendental witness of all three .
For the sake of speculation, let us for the moment
entertain the possibility that these realms of being rep-
resent actual realities that cannot be reduced to states
of mindbody alone (Arcari, Combs, & Krippner, in
preparation; Combs, 2002; Wilber, 1998a). This
would mean that at least some of the reports of such
alternative realms of experience found in spiritual and
shamanic traditions throughout the world may be
valid in the same way that travel reports of individuals
who have visited other countries can be valid. It also
would mean that certain dynamical configurations of
the mindbody carry us not only into altered states of
consciousness, in the usual sense, but also into other
realms of being. This is a radical idea from the point of
view of Western science, but in less technical terms is
taken for granted by virtually all wisdom traditions
throughout the world. It would be foolish for us to
argue the physics or metaphysics of such a proposition,
though the authors speculate on this elsewhere (Arcari,
Combs, & Krippner, in preparation). But in a scientific
community that takes seriously such theoretical won-
ders as black holes, multiple universes, galaxies that
travel backward in time, and nonlocal quantum
effects, it is hardly defensible to dismiss any serious
proposal simply because it does not fit with traditional
opinions.
Returning, however, to states of consciousness and
levels of development, several theorists have pointed to
a simpatico, if not an actual identity, between
advanced postconventional levels of psychological
development and certain peak, or mystical, states of
consciousness (Combs, 2002; Cook-Greuter, 1999;
Kelly, 1999; Wade 1996; Washburn, 1988; Wilber,
1998b). Wilber, for instance, has gone so far as to sug-
gest titles for these developmental levels that indicate
their affinity with the realms to which they seem most
strongly affiliated, as seen in the middle column in
Table 1 (levels 7–10). Now, the idea that the dynamical
regimes that undergird the highest postconventional
levels of development are themselves states of con-
sciousness, and further that these are somehow reso-
nant with realms of being that have been described in
traditional wisdom literatures from around the world,
may seem a considerable stretch. But perhaps this is
only because we have arrived at this possibility through
such tortuous reasoning! If we were simply to say that
human growth at its highest levels becomes spiritual,
at which point the individual becomes increasingly
conscious of  subtle realms of being—or more conser-
vatively, is subject to mystical experiences—the whole
proposition seems less labored. In accord with this
view, virtually all major theoretical models of psycho-
logical growth increasingly emphasize selflessness if
not explicit spirituality at the highest levels of develop-
ment (e.g., Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Gilligan, 1993;
Cook-Greuter, 1999; Kegan, 1982, 1994; Kohlberg,
1981; Maslow, 1971).
Approaching the problem from another point of
view, we find that without making the assumption that
there is an equivalence between the most advanced lev-
els of development and certain states of consciousness,
and more, that these may be uniquely allied with par-
ticular realms of being, it is difficult to explain why
mystical experiences, evidently more common than
one might imagine (Greeley & McCready, 1975;
Spence, 1992), should so clearly prefigure experiences
commonly ascribed to persons at later developmental
stages (Combs, 2002; Wilber, 1998b, 2002). Or why
such peak experiences should have so much in com-
mon when reported by individuals at different levels of
development (e.g., Maslow, 1971). Thinking about
such problems, theologian Randall Studsill (2002) has
carefully examined the mystical experiences described
in Tibetan Buddhist Dzogchen literature, comparing
these with the Rhineland mystic tradition, especially
exemplified in the writings of Meister Eckhart. He
found the similarities to be striking. However, he also
approached this analysis from a point of view similar
to the dynamical systems perspective presented in this
paper. In doing so, he took pains to point out the awk-
wardness of attempting to explain how temporary
peak or mystical experiences had by ordinary people
can prefigure the stable characteristics of later well-
established patterns of experience such as those
described in these two traditions.
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Let us again note, as well, that no matter what
state of consciousness, or realm of being, an individual
might experience, we can expect that upon returning
to ordinary waking consciousness he or she will inter-
pret that experience according to his or her own level
of development. Let us say, for instance, that someone
has a “peak experience” of Vedanta’s subtle, or even
causal realm. If that person is functioning develop-
mentally at Gebser’s (1949/1986) mythic structure
(Table 1; stages 3 & 4; representational mind and con-
crete operations thinking) they will explain their experi-
ence in mythic terms—for example, in terms of deities
or devils, and perhaps grand mythic motifs involving
heavens and hells. If on the other hand their dominant
developmental level were at Gebser’s mental structure
(stage 5, formal operations thinking), then they would
offer logical explanations, perhaps speaking in terms of
grand visions of nature and the physical cosmos.
The idea that each person would interpret peak
experiences of other realms of being, whether they are
independent realities or not, in terms of his or her own
developmental level led both Combs (1995) and
Wilber (1998b) independently to outline a set of pos-
sible intersections between such experiences and the
developmental levels to which the person might
return, once back to ordinary consciousness. They
subsequently named the graphic representation of this
idea the “Wilber-Combs Lattice” (Combs, 2002),
shown in Table 2.  Here, each box represents the inter-
section of a developmental level, shown in the left
hand column, and a realm of being suggested by
Vedanta, seen in the row on top. Note that in this table
the subtle realm is divided along traditional lines into
a lower subtle, or “psychic” realm, and a higher, or true
subtle realm. 
The Wilber-Combs Lattice is a potentially useful
guide for identifying and studying a vast range of peak
or spiritual experiences, and the interpretations of
those experiences as reported by individuals at differ-
ent developmental levels. And, let us remember that
these developmental levels correspond to historical
epochs as well. Thus, for example, the mind of a level
3 or 4 individual has throughout history tended to
interpret experiences suggestive of even the most sub-
tle realms of being in terms of gods, goddesses, and
mythic narratives, while a level 2 person interprets
similar experiences in terms of magical beings, nature
spirits, and synchronicities. 
We should note, however, that along with Jean
Gebser the present writers view the insights of every
developmental structure to be valid in their own
worlds of experience, and we do not elevate any struc-
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Table 2. A partial Wilber-Combs Lattice.
Levels1/Realms2 Gross        Psychic Subtle Causal Nondual
Nondual3 — — — — —
Causal — — — — —
Subtle — — — — —
Psychic4 — — — — —
Integral Consciousness, or 
Vision Logic — — — — —
Formal Operations — — — — —
Concrete Operations — — — — —
Representational mind
(Early Concrete Operations) — — — — —
Phantasmic-emotional — — — — —
(Preoperational) — — — — —
Sensorimotor — — — — —
1Levels of development. Terms are based on a number of developmental systems; e.g., see Wilber (1998a).
2Realms of being. These may be thought of as actual realms of being, or states of consciousness that carry a strong sense 
of reality.
3Ever-present ordinary mind; the direct experience of the nondual ground.
4Psychic = lower subtle
ture, with the possible exception of nondual aware-
ness, above any other. Moreover, as Kohlberg (1981),
Torbert (1972), Wade (1996), and other developmen-
tal psychologists have shown over and over again, the
evaluation of a person’s, or even a culture’s, dominant
developmental level is not as simple as it may seem.
For instance, a person who appears to exhibit postcon-
ventional morality may, in fact, simply be mouthing
statements heard from others. The way an individual
thinks, perceives reality, and approaches the world
must all be examined. For example, a contemporary
shaman may make excellent use of magical technolo-
gies but think about them from a stage 6 or even high-
er developmental perspective. Finally, consider the
spiritual experiences of children, presumably near the
bottom of the developmental scale. Children some-
times report experiences of “angelic” realms of con-
sciousness ordinarily reserved for saints and sages (e.g.,
Morse with Perry, 1990; Wilber, 2002). They, of
course, interpret these with the mind of a child, but
this does not mean that they do not have genuine spir-
itual experiences.
And so, the visions of children, like the illumina-
tions of mystics and the epiphanies of ordinary
humans, all remind us that not only is the world much
richer and more diverse than science once imagined,
but the dimensions of human experience surpass our
finest dreams.
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